compared to the earlier discussion on the Arab Spring. Here, Monshipouri concentrates on the 2009 Green Movement in Iran (that is, the protests in the aftermath of the presidential elections). The author’s argument is that protest events in Iran in 2009 can be interpreted as precursors to the Arab Spring in that both demanded fair, uncropt government and emphasized human rights issues, especially insofar as the regimes violently suppressed the masses.

In general, Monshipouri’s book offers a rather eclectic discussion of the many issues that one can derive from the Arab Spring. In multiple places, the author either does not refer to important scholarship or build up the necessary historical background (especially for those new to the Middle East). For instance, the author does not refer to social mobilization literature in general and specifically on the Middle East. Then, notably, there is not much—if any—space devoted to earlier instances of social mobilization in the Middle East; similarly, it is worth reminding readers that use of technology is not new to mobilization efforts in the region (or elsewhere): while in exile, Ayatollah Khomeini used tapes, video recordings to reach out to the Iranians.

Monshipouri’s *Democratic Uprisings in the Middle East* is very accessible and presents a wealth of information that outlines the dynamics of the Arab Spring. However, for an expanded scholarly debate on the causes of Arab uprisings and theoretical insights into social mobilization (broadly and specifically, in the Middle East), readers will need more-detailed discussion.

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After being largely ignored for far too long, the deeper psychological, biological, and evolutionary bases of political beliefs have made for something of a crowded book market of late. Jonathan Haidt’s, *The Righteous Mind* continues to receive much deserved attention; Milt Lodge and Charles Taber’s *The Rationalizing Voter* is another important recent contribution, and my own book—*Predisposed*—(with Kevin B. Smith and John Alford) was published at about the same time as Avi Tuschman’s *Our Political Nature*. In light of this situation, readers are likely to wonder whether Tuschman makes a unique and important contribution to the field and the answer is that he clearly does.

Tuschman believes three core personality clusters shape human political orientations: tribalism, inequality, and perceptions of human nature.
Tuschman further believes that each of these clusters derives from evolutionary pressures and that these traits and their corresponding pressures structure the six parts of this immensely engaging book. The first part explains tribalism; the second, tribalism’s evolutionary roots. The third part explains inequality; the fourth, inequality’s evolutionary roots. The fifth part explains perceptions of the human condition; the sixth, these perceptions’ evolutionary roots. As Tuschman sees it, the tribalism cluster is connected primarily to mate choice; the inequality cluster to the nuclear family; and perceptions of human nature to altruism outside the immediate tribe.

What sets this book apart? This organizational structure allows an amazing amount of ground to be covered. In addition to its tremendous scope, Tuschman’s book is set apart by the extent to which he sees politics through “evolutionary glasses” (p. 13). Finally, the third personality cluster (perceptions of human nature) is also somewhat novel. Previous attempts to delineate the core principles dividing liberals and conservatives have focused on attitudes toward change and attitudes toward inequality, with conservatives tending to prefer stability even if it leads to inequality, and liberals tending to prefer equality even if it requires change. As such, variations in perception of the human condition have received less attention. Tuschman fixes that.

Because the book is so fresh and provocative, it naturally generates questions and alternative points of view. First, do these three personality clusters cover the entire gamut and do they operate independently of each other or tend to combine into meta political orientations? Second, I am not sure I fully agree with Tuschman’s connection of attitudes toward inequality to matters of the nuclear family rather than the tribe (see Part III). After all, though the distribution of family resources is important, much current and past political debate is about how to divide resources across members of society at large. Finally, I am a big believer in the value of an evolutionary perspective, but, particularly in the modern age, as selection pressures are relaxed, it may be possible to push it too far. For example, Tuschman makes much of the role of mate choice in structuring politics and suggests that liberals want more liberals around because they want to expand their mate choices. As Tuschman concedes, however, liberals also are using birth control with abandon, so perhaps populating the world with more liberals is not their ultimate goal. Procreation aside, perhaps liberals simply enjoy the company of other liberals just as conservatives enjoy the company of other conservatives.

Still, details in need of further reflection can be identified by any reviewer. The important point is that the discipline of political science has been far too slow to locate politics firmly inside the evolved human condition, tending instead to view politics as exogenous, culturally idiosyncratic, and entirely
learned. *Our Political Nature* constitutes a bold, valuable, and eminently readable strike against that outdated view.

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Competing Motives in the Partisan Mind: How Loyalty and Responsiveness Shape Party Identification and Democracy


Partisanship is at the center of the analysis of citizenship in democratic societies. Many great minds have focused their attention on this topic, and to make a real impact on how we understand partisanship—to do something truly *new* in this literature—is no easy task. Eric Groenendyk wants to do just that, and I think he succeeds. Drawing insight from some of the most important work in the social cognitive psychology of the last few decades, he blends the traditionalist and revisionist perspectives on partisanship within a dual-motivations theory. In brief: as citizens, we are subject to two core motivational forces that often conflict: *directional* motives that lead us to seek conclusions that reinforce our partisan identities, and *accuracy* motives that compel a search for the conclusions that best fit objective reality. Taken together, we not only want to believe that our party is superior to the opposing party, but also we want to believe that we are *justified* in believing this to be true. Sometimes this is easy—say, a rising economy under a co-partisan president—but often it is not. Groenendyk focuses on how citizens negotiate these competing motivations as they confront unpleasant realities, and what happens when they fail. The overall picture that emerges is one of justificatory citizenship: citizens motivated by the desire to maintain a picture of the world favorable to their party, but who nonetheless feel accountable to internalized standards of good citizenship.

Despite the introduction of accountability pressures into the model, and thus the reality of some volatility in partisanship, Groenendyk’s citizens have wide latitude to reason their way to preferred conclusions. Indeed, one of the most-interesting contributions of the book is a theoretical and empirical investigation of the strategies that citizens utilize to justify continued identification with their party when confronted with facts that cast doubt on the value of that identity. For example, Groenendyk posits the “lesser of two evils” strategy: citizens will often adjust their opinion of the *opposing* party downward in response to negative information about their *own* party, thus justifying continued identification (“at least my party is not as bad as *them!*”). Interestingly, the theory thus predicts a positive association between evaluations of the